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SECTION 1983 CASES ARISING FROM
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Gail Donoghue'
There are many cases where the reversal of a criminal
conviction gives rise to a civil action under Section 1983.2 In such
cases, a plaintiff seeks to be compensated for time spent in prison
as well as other damages normally claimed under Section 1983.
What I would like to do today is point out some of the issues I
think you should be aware of by reference to a case that I spent a
great deal of time litigating.
Factually, our case involved a former member of the Black
Panther Party who had been accused and prosecuted for shooting
two police officers with a machine gun on Riverside Drive in 1971.
He was tried twice for this crime. The first trial resulted in a hung
jury and the second trial in a conviction. At the time that the
police shootings took place, there were widespread incidents of
police officers being shot across the United States. As a result, the
FBI had become involved in a nationwide investigation of the
Black Panther Party and other militant groups that advocated the
-' J.D., Pace Law School, 1980; L.L.M., New York University School of
Law, 1984. Ms. Donoghue taught at Pace Law School from 1982 to 1984. She
then worked as an associate for three years at Warshaw, Burstein, Cohen,
Schlesinger and Kuh. Since 1987, Ms. Donoghue has worked at New York
City's Law Department's Office of the Corporation Counsel where she
maintains the position of Chief of the Special Federal Litigation Division.
Specifically, she heads the division that serves to defend the City and its
officials in civil rights cases brought in federal court. In 1995, the Corporation
Counsel presented Ms. Donoghue with a special recognition award for
outstanding service. In addition to her vast responsibilities, Ms. Donoghue also
serves on the faculty of Practising Law Institute's Conference on Section 1983
Civil Rights Litigation and Continuing Legal Education programs at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000):
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in any action of law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress....
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shooting of police officers in their literature and in their rhetoric.
The FBI conducted an intense investigation separate and apart
from the police department's investigation. The FBI developed an
extensive file and ultimately prepared a report consisting of
approximately 103 pages of individual witness statements taken by
FBI agents. At some point, the report was provided to the Chief of
the Police Department. However, this particular report was never
produced to the criminal defense. It contained statements made to
the FBI by the main witness against the plaintiff, which had never
surfaced during the criminal prosecution. The plaintiff discovered
this report because of circumstances that had nothing to do with
the criminal proceeding. He came into possession of these
documents as a result of discovery in a Section 1983 action that he
brought against the FBI and the City of New York for engaging in
a counterintelligence program against the Black Panther Party.
The 103 page report contained material which should have been
available to the plaintiff during the criminal prosecution. We were
never able to determine the path the report took from the time it
was provided to the Chief of the Department until it was
subsequently discovered in the civil litigation. However, it was
found that this packet surfaced in other prosecutions of other
members of the Black Panther Party and was turned over in the
course of those prosecutions.
The main witness against the plaintiff in his criminal case
was a young woman who had allowed her home to be used as a
safehouse by the plaintiff and other members of his group. As
part of her testimony, she claimed to know of the plans for the
shooting of the police officers. She testified in detail about the
events on the night of the shooting. Her testimony included: what
time the plaintiff left, that he left with a machine gun, and that
when he returned home she helped him clean out spent bullet
casings from a car that she believed was used in the shooting. This
was the only testimony against the plaintiff directly tying him to
the shooting of the police officers on Riverside Drive.
The interesting aspect about these cases when they come up
in the civil context, is which questions are for the jury and which
questions are for the judge. In the criminal context when you have
726 [Vol 18
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a Brady3 issue, the judge decides in the first instance whether or
not documents constitute Brady material and should be disclosed.
If the judge makes the determination that the plaintiff was entitled
to those materials, he sets aside the conviction so that the plaintiff
can have a new trial with the benefit of the Brady material he
should have had the first time. The jury in the second criminal trial
will then determine guilt or innocence and thus whether the Brady
material would have made a difference. It is not that simple in the
context of Section 1983 claims. Should the civil jury in a
Section 1983 action decide in the first instance whether the
materials were Brady and should have been turned over, or should
the judge make that determination?
The standard for whether or not material is Brady contains
a number of factors to be considered.4 One important factor is
whether or not this material would give rise to a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different.5 Who is
going to decide that in the context of a civil action alleging a Brady
violation? In the case I have described to you, this question had
still not been decided after three full days of motions in limine
before the district judge. We went through hundreds of documents
but never reached the question of whether any of it was Brady. In
requesting that the district judge make Brady determinations, we
analogized it to the criminal context where the Court makes the
initial decision.6 It was our belief that certain of these materials
were not Brady, and thus could be admitted as part of the
plaintiff's case. That particular issue got deferred and the case
ultimately settled without any resolution.
As a civil litigant raising a Brady claim, a plaintiff must
prove that the Brady violation resulted in an unfair trial or unjust
3 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppression of
evidence by the prosecution that is favorable to an accused who has requested it
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution).
4 See United States v. Hughes, 71 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (N.D. Tex. 1999). The
defendant must prove: "1) the prosecution suppressed or withheld evidence; 2)
the evidence was favorable to the defense; and 3) the evidence was material to
either guilt or punishment." Id.'
5 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995).6 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.
2002 727
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conviction.7 Therefore, the question that must be presented to the
jury is whether or not the Brady material would have made a
difference had it been available during plaintiffs trial. However, I
see no reason why the court should not make the initial
determination as to whether something is Brady. When you have a
civil case based on Brady, you are not likely to have the
intervening criminal court jury, because nine times out of ten, the
prosecution declines to reprosecute after a reversal on Brady
grounds. In our case, the plaintiff did not discover the Brady
material until approximately ten years after his conviction. By the
time the discovery was made, the sheer passage of time had caused
the loss of both physical evidence and witnesses. It was on that
basis that the prosecutor in our case made a determination not to
retry the case. We believed, after years of working on this case,
that the jury in the civil trial would have had great difficulty in
deciding whether the Brady material would have made a difference
and that simply presenting the evidence posed enormous trial
management problems.
There were many problems that arose during the course of
the trial. There were two criminal trials in our case. They each
lasted a month. They each had approximately seven thousand
pages of testimony. In both of these trials, there were nearly a
thousand pages of cross-examination of the main prosecution
witness against the defendant. How do you present a jury with all
that testimony so it can assess the significance of the undisclosed
statements in the context of full trial record? How do you present
a jury with seven thousand pages of testimony? Logistically, it is
an unbelievable nightmare. The district judge was not sure how to
handle this. The plaintiffs attorney suggested summaries, which
sounds good on the surface, but whose summaries? How long
would it take to negotiate an agreement about what should be in
the summaries? It is hard to find language that would not suggest
innuendos, implications, and inferences that would be
unacceptable to one side or the other. While summaries seemed
like a possibility, it was apparent that they were not the answer.
7 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. ("The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the concealed
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.").
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The way we decided to handle the situation, because we were
ready to start trial, was to offer all the trial testimony into evidence,
and use whatever charts would be needed to highlight important
portions of the record in the closing arguments. In the weeks
before the trial, we started planning a power point presentation for
closing arguments. Our plan was to put statements that were
supposedly Brady, (which plaintiff said would have resulted in his
acquittal), into context by showing a number of things: first, there
was similar testimony by other witnesses; second, the witness
herself had made similar statements in reports that were provided
to the defense and third, there was other corroborating evidence.
The use of a power point presentation would help keep the jury
focused through a very detailed presentation.
Another complicated question that comes up for trial, is
when guilt or innocence is relevant and hence, when testimony that
bears on guilt or innocence in the underlying criminal proceeding
may be admitted. Arguably, a Brady civil case should be limited
to the Brady material that was not turned over and the trial record.
A jury should be able to decide based on the trial record alone
whether the Brady material would have made a difference. In a
case where the plaintiffs claim is limited to the failure to provide
the Brady material, evidence about whether or not the plaintiff is
guilty or innocent should not be admissible. There may be
circumstances, however, where the plaintiff's allegations are more
complicated. In our case, the plaintiff took the position that he was
an innocent man who was framed as a result of a plot instigated by
the district attorney in conjunction with the New York City Police
Department and the FBI. The plaintiff opened the door on his
innocence or guilt, making it possible to offer some very damaging
testimony about his guilt. Another aspect of our case was that the
plaintiff considered himself a political prisoner and gave a lot of
interviews, and made a lot of statements after his conviction, some
which were incriminating. In the civil action, he sued for First
Amendment violations because of the counterintelligence program
of the FBI. He gave a deposition in which he made admissions
about what he was doing the night the officers were shot which
were at odds with innocence and corroborated testimony given
against him at trial. This was relevant evidence in our case,
because the plaintiff went beyond Brady allegations in claiming
2002 729
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innocence and a widespread conspiracy to frame him. We
intended to offer all his testimony by way of cross-examination. If
the claim is limited, however, to whether the plaintiff got a fair
trial, evidence of guilt or innocence that developed subsequent to
the prosecution should not be relevant.
Another issue is whether or not collateral estoppel applies
with respect to issues litigated in the context of the underlying
criminal proceeding. The way these cases often come up is in the
context of a motion to vacate the conviction. When the court
reviews that motion, it may apply a state law standard as to what
must be turned over, not necessarily a Brady standard. You should
be sensitive to whether there are different standards under the
criminal law in your state than under Brady, especially if the
decision to set aside the verdict turned entirely on state law. For
example, under New York Law, any prior statement of a trial
witness must be turned over. 8 This type of material is called
Rosario material. It does not have to be exculpatory or
inconsistent as under Brady. We pressed the issue of the different
standards in attempting to exclude documents during the motion in
limine. We argued that there were a lot of Rosario statements,
which were not Brady, and hence should not come into evidence.
The plaintiff however, argued that the statements were relevant to
his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and conspiracy.
The issue of collateral estoppel turns on the established
principles of law, the most important of which is whether the
municipality was a party to the criminal proceedings. In our case,
the municipality was not a party to the criminal prosecution
because the district attorney is a state actor. However, the
individual police officers who had originally been sued had been
dismissed from the action, and the district attorneys had been
dismissed because they had absolute immunity. Thus, the only
remaining defendant was the municipality. We argued that we
were not collaterally estopped by anything that had taken place in
the criminal proceeding and the court agreed. But let us suppose,
if the district attorney remained in the case, should he be estopped?
Was he a party to the criminal prosecution? I do not know what
8 People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961)
(holding any statement made by a government witness must be made available
to the defense for purposes of cross-examination and impeachment).
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the answer is to that question. I think it is an interesting issue,
because the district attorney is the prosecutor, and the prosecution
represents the people, and the people are a party in a criminal
proceeding.
Discussion Between Participants
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The district attorney is sued
personally under the Brady claim, correct?
MS. DONOGHUE: Under Brady, it is hard to keep the
prosecution in the case because generally the decision whether or
not to turn a document over comes within the prosecutorial
function. However, he could remain in the case where other
prosecutorial misconduct is claimed.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: If the district attorney is sued
officially, then the question is going to be whether the district
attorney is a municipal policymaker. If so, then it is a claim
against the municipality, so collateral estoppel would not apply.
However, if the district attorney is a state policymaker, then it
becomes a claim against the state, and the Eleventh Amendment
would come into play.
MS. DONOGHUE: Trying to get your case in a posture
where individual defendants have immunity is a good position
because it forces the plaintiff to prove a Monell case.9  The
plaintiff would not only have to prove there was a Brady violation,
which resulted in an unfair trial, but also that there was a failure to
train or supervise with respect to the turning over of Brady
material. The failure to train or supervise can be a difficult
standard to meet because most prosecutor's offices have extensive
training programs on Brady, provide substantial supervision and
have practices with respect to supervision which are followed. It is
9 See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660 (1978) (holding that a
local government may not be sued under § 1983 based solely on the fact that an
employee or agent of the local government inflicted the injury. The government
can, however, be held responsible when the injury was inflicted through the
execution of a government policy or custom).
2002
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difficult to prove. a widespread practice of withholding Brady,
because what evidence is the plaintiff going to have to prove that
the Brady material was withheld? In our case, the plaintiff
intended to offer a list of reported decisions in which courts had
found that materials were withheld. The plaintiff came up with
about twenty decisions over a twenty-year period for all five
county prosecutor's offices. We made a motion in limine to keep
these decisions out on various grounds. We argued that twenty
reported decisions spanning a period of twenty years could not be
the basis for liability for the following reasons: first, it was
hearsay; second, it would result in the litigation of each and every
one of those cases to determine the circumstances under which
material was withheld; and third, there are well over four-hundred
thousand criminal proceedings. Therefore, twenty reported
decisions of Brady violations does not constitute a widespread
practice.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Did the judge give any
indication as to how he would rule on whether negligence would
be sufficient to make out a Brady violation in a Section 1983 claim
or did the plaintiff have to prove intent? In the criminal sphere,
negligence would be enough, but the Supreme Court has held that
in Section 1983 due process claims negligence is not enough.' 0
MS. DONOGHUE: I think the judge determined that the
standard was going to be intent. The plaintiff was going to have to
show that there was an intent to withhold these materials. The
plaintiff had a negligence claim. However, because he had not
filed a timely notice of claim, that negligence claim was barred.
This was a blessing for us, because we thought the most the
plaintiff could show here was that there may have been some
negligence in how these documents were handled. There was no
way the plaintiff was going to show a deliberate, intentional policy
on the part of the district attorney.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The Fourth Circuit decided a
case on this issue. The judges split right down the middle, half of
10 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
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them said the plaintiff has to show intent, the other half said
negligence is sufficient."
MS. DONOGHUE: Under Brady, a plaintiff does not have
to show anything. The mere fact that material was not turned over
is all a plaintiff has to show. Therefore, the intent element is an
interesting one. If you get one of these cases, you have to hit the
books. You have to know Brady pretty well, as well as the
criminal procedure law in your state. You will have to address
immunity issues and trial presentation issues. We settled our case
for less than a half million dollars to compensate for twenty-five
years of incarceration and twenty-five years of attorney's fees. To
the extent we could not really definitively establish why this packet
of FBI documents had not reached the plaintiff, we felt
uncomfortable. We thought a jury might have been sympathetic to
the fact that the plaintiff was charged with a serious crime and
should have had the documents. We thought that the mere fact that
the plaintiff did not have the packet might have led the jury to
compensate him. We were pretty confident that the jury would not
return a runaway verdict either, because the evidence of guilt was
strong.
Another case that I worked on during its pre-trial stage was
Baba-Ali v. City of New York.12 A lot of money was on the table
in this case. It involved a man who was prosecuted for sexual
abuse of his child.13  The prosecution relied on the medical
examination by a city physician who said that the child had been
raped by her father. In subsequent years, that evaluation was
discredited.' 5  His conviction was reversed but he was not
prosecuted. We were concerned about this case. A lesson was
learned from what happened in the civil trial. The jury came away
feeling that the doctor who had performed the discredited medical
evaluation was the only person in this child's life who cared about
" Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000). An equally divided en banc
court held that a negligent miscommunication between officers and the
prosecutor did not deprive the plaintiff of any Fourteenth Amendment right, and,
therefore, there was no § 1983 liability. Id. at 658.
2 979 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
' Id. at 272.
14 Id. at 271.
5 Id. at 272.
2002
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what might have happened to her. As a result, the jury was
unwilling to say that what the doctor did was deliberate and
intentional lying in order to convict this man of a crime he did not
commit. I think the guilt or innocence aspect is always there.
Jurors do not want to give money to someone they feel committed
a crime. The problem, however, is what the jury is going to be
asked to decide. The proper jury instruction is that: you must find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury in the criminal
trial would not have found the plaintiff guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt if it had been aware of the Brady material.16 I can not tell
you how many hours we talked about this, how many pizzas and
bottles of soda went down trying to figure out how we were going
to ask the judge to deal with this issue. They are great cases, lots
of work but very challenging.
16 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999); see also U.S. v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985).
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